Co-edited with Gerald Lang. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012 (contributions by John Broome, Jonathan Dancy, David Enoch, Ulrike Heuer, Brad Hooker, Gerald Lang, Philip Pettit, Joseph Raz, Michael Smith, Jay Wallace, Susan Wolf).
- Review by L. Nandi Theunissen, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 02/2013
Gründe und Motive. Über Humesche Theorien praktischer Vernunft
mentis Verlag, Paderborn 2001, 260 pages.
- Review by Ralf Stoecker in Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (2002), 247-250.
The Normative Significance of Intentions. Co-edited with Matthew Smith (with contributions by Luca Ferrero, Richard Holton, Hallie Liberto, Erasmus Mayr, David Owens, Sarah Paul, Joseph Raz, Ralph Wedgwood, Fiona Woollard). Special Issue of Philosophical Explorations (20th Anniversary Issue), 20:2, 13 October 2017.
Motives and Interpretation: On Friedrich Waismann, Will and Motive. (Forthcoming)
The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons. For C. McHugh, J Way, D Whiting, eds, Epistemic and Practical Normativity, Oxford University Press.
Moralischer Zufall und Kontrolle durch Fertigkeiten. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Vol. 70 (2016), pp. 5-27.
Reasons to Intend. For Daniel Star (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
Intentions, Permissibility, and the Reasons for Which We Act in Pavlakos, G. & V. Rodriguez-Blanco (eds), Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press 2015, pp. 11-30. (The link is to the final draft.)
Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114:3 (2014), pp. 291-316. (The link is to the penultimate draft.)
The Reasons That Can't Be Followed. Comment on J. Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility in The Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 2013, vol. 8: 1-14 (with a reply by the author).
Promising – Part 1 in Philosophy Compass 7 (12): 832-841, 2012
Promising – Part 2 in Philosophy Compass 7 (12): 842-851, 2012
Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons in Heuer & Lang (eds), Luck, Value and Commitment, OUP 2012, pp. 219-246 (link is to the penultimate draft)
Introduction (with Gerald Lang) in Heuer, Lang (eds) Luck, Value and Commitment, Oxford University Press 2012, pp. 1-16
Guided by Reasons: Raz on the Normative-Explanatory Nexus in Jurisprudence 2 (2), 2011, 353-365 (link is to the penultimate draft)
The Paradox of Deontology, Revisited in Mark Timmons (ed), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 236-67.
Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value in Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics, Palgrave: 2010, pp. 166-184 (link is to the penultimate draft)
Wrongness and Reasons in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol 13:2 (April 2010), 137-152 (link is to the penultimate draft)
Reasons and Impossibility in Philosophical Studies, Vol 147, No 2, 2010, 235-246, 2010.
Moralische Motivation in S. Gosepath, W. Hinsch, B. Roessler (eds), Handbuch der politischen Philosophie und Sozialphilosophie, Berlin: deGruyter 2008
Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop? in Journal for Ethics and Social Philosophy, Vol 1:3, 2006.
Internalism and Externalism in Ethics in Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2nd edition, New York: Macmillan 2005.
Reasons for Actions and Desires in Philosophical Studies 121, 2004, 43-63.
Raz on Reasons and Values in Pettit, Scheffler, Smith, Wallace (eds), Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, 129-52.
Sind Wünsche Handlungsgründe? In Analyse und Kritik Vol 21, 1999, 1-24.
Haben meine Gründe etwas mit mir zu tun? Bernard Williams Erwiderung of John McDowell in J. Nida-Rümelin (ed), Analyomen 3, 606-614. Walter deGruyter Berlin 1999.
Zum Begriff der moralischen Motivation in G. Meggle (ed.) Analyomen 2, Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, 243-250. Walter deGruyter, Berlin 1997.
- Book on intentions and the reasons for which we act (working title: Intentions Unbound. The Rationality and Morality of Intentions).
- Acting Intentionally
- Rationality as responsiveness to reasons. (Investigating John Broome's criticism of the view that being rational consists in responding to one's reasons, or the reasons the agent believes she has).
- Professor Procrastinate's Reasons.