In 2014-15 I held a BA funded mid-career fellowship to work on the moral significance of intentions. The project comprises four parts:
1. Understanding intentional agency: what is it to act intentionally? Is it acting with an intention? Or is is acting for a reason? I critically discuss both of these suggestions developing a different proposal. See: "Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CXIV, part 3 (link in Research).
2. Reasons to intend and the rationality of intentions: what are our reasons to intend? Should an agent form an intention to do what she believes she has reason to to? I show that this is not so - reasons to intend are not like reasons to believe in the way it has sometimes been proposed by proponent of the so-called 'Symmetry View'. See: "Reasons to Intend" in D. Star (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press (forthcoming), and "Two Kinds of Wrong Reasons" (links to come soon).
3. Does the Doctrine of Double Effect capture the way in which intentions are morally significant? Based on (1) and (2), I argue that intentions can determine the moral rightness or wrongness of an action in particular cases, but not in the way DDE has it. See: "Intentions, Permissibility, and the Reasons for Which We Act" in G. Pavlakos & V. Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.) Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming). (Link in Research)
4. Are we responsible for what we do intentionally, and only for that? I argue that the moral luck cases show that our moral responsibility goes further, but that the view of intentional agency developed in (1) is nonetheless crucial to understanding the limits of responsibility. See: "Moral Luck and Rational Control" (link to come soon).
The project included an intensive workshop and a international conference on those topics. Further further information see:
In 2014-15, I am a Guest Research Professor in the ERC advanced project 'Distortions of Normativity' at the University of Vienna. The plan is to turn the research conducted during the year of the BA fellowship into a book-length exploration of the subject.