My work is primarily on theories of practical reasons, in action theory, and in normative ethics. Practical reasons are the leitmotif that connects the different topics I've been expounding (e.g. buck-passing accounts of value, the paradox of deontology, promissory obligation). The focus of my current research is on action theory and moral psychology (intentions, responsibility, moral luck).
For 2013-14, I received a mid-career fellowship from the British Academy. I have been working on intentions: what they are; how they relate to the reasons for which we act, whether they are morally significant, and, if so, whether the doctrine of double effect captures how they affect moral evaluation.
In 2014-15 I was a Guest Research Professor at the University of Vienna as part of the ERC funded project Distortions of Normativity. I have been pulling together some of the research I did before, working on a book-length exploration of the relation of intentions, reasons and the reasons for which we act (working title: Intentions Unbound. The Rationality and Morality of Intentions).
I'm an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at University College London (UCL).
Before coming to London, I was an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Leeds and before that an assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. I've also held fixed-term positions at Columbia University, and Barnard College, New York, and at Balliol College, Oxford, and I have been a faculty fellow of the Center for Ethics and Public Affairs at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University, New Orleans (2004-5), and of the Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University (2008-9). I am a member of the Einstein Ethics Network. And I did my graduate work at the Free University in Berlin under the supervision of Jay Wallace.
Full c.v. (pdf).